Quotations about

There was a time when the search for a 'cognitive psychology' was for a psychology that would recognize experienced processes of perception and thinking. Such a cognitive psychology would be concerned with human consciousness as distinct from the mechanical reflexes to which academic behaviourism had envisaged that consciousness might be scientifically 'reduced.' Thus, over the years, psychologists (and allied co-workers) like Albert Ellis, Edward Tolman, Charles Osgood, George Kelly, Carl Rogers, Herbert Simon, Noam Chomsky, George Miller, Jerome Bruner, Julian Rotter, Albert Bandura and Aaron Beck would all, in their various ways, gain reputations for seeming to champion, amidst the increasingly obvious sterility of behaviourism, some variety of 'mentalism.' However, when the breakthrough came, around 1975, the 'cognitive psychology' that emerged was markedly less cognitive than many such forerunners would have liked. Essentially, most academics who moved into cognitivism took the view that the demise of behaviourism licensed them merely to investigate internal, non-observable 'black box' mechanisms and processes that had been banished under strict behaviourism; and to adopt the electronic computer and its programs as the handiest 'models' of what perception and thinking might involve. 'Thinking' and 'feeling' were to be used as mere labels for what were, to cognitivists, nothing but the information-processing functions of neurophysiological events. 'Perception', 'search', 'counting' and 'recall' came to be thought of as being performed by black boxes and brain parts rather than by people; and the everyday cognitive psychology of 'flashes of insight' and 'failures of will' was once more set aside.
Thus two very different exercises have claimed the title of cognitive psychology. Still, both the ancient seekers after true cognitivism (i.e. mentalism-but they dared not call it that for risk of slipping into humanistic and phenomenological psychology) and the harder-bitten, newer-style, ex-behaviourist exponents of how-to-get-grants-to-play-with-computers have agreed on two key matters.
(1) A riot of new, soft-edged, not-too-committal, not-too-measurable, computer-semi-literate, user-friendly terminology was essential to distinguish the latest 'New Psychology' from the old.
(2) The study of cognitive processes should certainly not have anything to do with the Godzilla-like primaeval horrors of g and IQ (Thus does modern psychology attempt to play Hamlet without the Prince! Cognitivists wanted to re-instate in psychology an interest in intelligent processes that the behaviourists had sacrificed on the altar of the conditioned reflex; but they would find the facts of life about intelligence too hot to handle and would come to prefer the computer-admittedly a more agreeable form of retreat for intelligent people than the smelly rodent laboratories of psychology's past.)

The Newer-Model Cognitivism and its problems

The last twenty years have witnessed the establishment of 'cognition' as the core subject matter of scientific psychology in the English-speaking world. Supposed 'models' of perception, of attention, of decision-making, of memory, and of reasoning have become allowable for psychologists. Diagrams with numerous arrows between verbally labelled boxes (to suggest hypothesized causal processes) are now as omnipresent in mainstream psychology as they have always been (as 'flow charts') in occupational psychology. Sometimes cognitive psychology can appear to be just one vast 'visual aid'. No longer do psychologists content themselves with describing the externally detectable 'laws' and regularities of input-output (stimulus-response) relations that were once the main stock-in-trade of the Skinnerian behaviourist who abjured mentalism. Unobservable 'information-processing mechanisms' and (more recently) 'neural networks' are postulated that supposedly allow people to be compared to computers and their programs and operations- rather than to the behaviourists' billiard balls. [A 'neural network' is meant to be more like a brain, thus rectifying a previous deficiency of cognitivism in paying no attention to actual biology. And few today would doubt that the mind depends on the brain. Yet the interesting question is how this happens. And this will never be shown by neural networks: for, if they are ever successful at mimicking the brain, their designers will not understand how they have done it any more than a proud parent understands how the brain of the child of its loins has come to cope with the video-recorder. For the human species, to (pro-)create intelligence has no necessary connection with understanding intelligence: this is what cognitivists forget.]
The attraction of cognitivism doubtless owes something to its apparent, much heralded 'recognition' of 'the mind', of intelligence (so long as this is not 'ridiculously' defined via dreadful old IQ!) and of consciousness. It also arises from the felt need amongst many psychologists for a science of these familiar features of mentality that does not require physiological, psychogenetic or factor-analytic expertise that they do not possess. The idea is that some true science of the mind can be established at a level which is different from that of our ordinary-language accounts of our experiences, abilities, plans and actions, while being more elevated than crass materialism and phrenology. Importantly, cognitivism seldom invokes the familiar psychoanalytic intermediary of some darkly 'unconscious' mind having special facilities (for 'repression', 'perceptual defence', 'projection', 'rationalization', 'sublimation' etc.) that might furnish novel explanations of our more mysterious actions. Rather, cognitivism's concern is usually to 'explain', somehow, quite everyday abilities of which we are virtually all reliably capable (e.g. recall, visualization, reasoning and language-use) by reference to supposed 'mechanisms and processes' that may be involved. Surging motivational pressures and deliberate forgetting are not central in the newer-model cognitivists' view of the composition of mentality.
Whether there truly exists such a level of computero-cognitive explanation that is intermediate as between folk psychology and biology is a moot point. Perhaps cognition (and emotion) are what the brain does, and there is no other locale at which mental events can be said to take place. - Rather similarly, perhaps, what a word-processor does is to display text on a screen and allow its correction: there is no other point within its operations at which words per se are being 'processed.' It is sometimes rudely suggested that cognitivism's black boxes of the mind and its 'components' of mentality are but erstwhile homunculi stripped of their more engaging faculties. Again, to account for why human beings are more intelligent than animals, and for why human beings differ among themselves in intelligence, would surely be real achievements that might have been expected from cognitivism. Yet, strangely, present-day cognitivists turn out to have no explanations at all to offer-nor even any hypotheses, so determined are they to dissociate themselves from the historic concerns (and poor P.R.) of the London School. In their concern to avoid real-life individual differences it is arguable that they have also missed much of what people have cognitively in common.
Understandably, cognitivists envisage that mental ability is resoluble into the efficient functioning of a number-well, a legion-of 'components', 'modules', 'resources', 'stores', 'scratchpads', 'desktops' and 'executives'. Yet it is not clear what these mental mini-entities and castrate homunculi are actually supposed to do. They may be said by their inventors to 'calculate', 'match-to-sample', 'represent' or 'decide'. But these operations of mini-entities can hardly resemble what happens when people themselves 'calculate' etc. So just what are they-above and beyond the whirring of physiological machinery (which cognitivists themselves, not being physiologists, do not profess to understand)? Certainly the number of proposed mini-entities of cognitivism now vastly exceeds even the 150 mental abilities once envisaged by the master psychometrician-psychologist, J.P.Guilford, who first tried to formulate a comprehensive and structured list of cognitive components; and it is so great as to be altogether superfluous to 'causing' the important observable differences between species and between people which are themselves relatively few in number. Moreover, cognitivism's enfeebled, supernumerary conceptual fragments from the dead world of artificial intelligence [still to produce a robot with an IQ as high as 2] are not even allowed to achieve any central thrust by operating as a team: for the very generality of human differences in measured mental abilities runs flatly contrary to the fondest assumptions of most cognitivists. (At least, they dare not admit g in their ceaseless, politically correct begging letters for government 'research' grants.) Frankly, were it not for the taxpayer-funded largesse that flows to them, cognitivists would be much happier explaining a world other than the one in which we actually live-in particular, a world in which Guilford's 150 abilities had indeed proved independent of each other in empirical data. Yet there is no such phenomenon to explain: there are only fond imaginings that this might be so, resembling nothing more than the pilot work of psychometrician-psychologists that went on long before cognitivism was a gleam in eye of a despairing behaviourist.
Thus cognitivists are left with their attempt to model man on the electronic computer-on to which can be tacked, as convenient, extra sub-systems of hardware and software to improve its entirely lacklustre performance in mimicking human intelligence. However, it is just not obvious that nature contrives things this way in man. Indeed, the evidence is quite otherwise: for level of general intelligence is itself a powerful constraining factor on the development and expression of most-if not all-mental abilities. {See Quotes VIII and IX for 'differentiation' proposals-as to how 'specific' abilities, independent of g, may emerge only when g itself is sufficiently high.}
Whether cognitivism is any more successful with 'the mind' or consciousness or intentionality than it is with intelligence can be left to the pitiless objections of philosophers (e.g. P.M.S.Hacker, 1988, Appearance and Reality). Yet it is perhaps worth pointing out one thing. A discipline that has, in twenty years, barely moved beyond the naive componentialist, multiple-intelligence visions of Thurstone, Guilford and Gardner {see Quotes VIII} seems unlikely to say much very soon about its chosen target, 'the mind'-let alone about those other, equally engaging aspects of personhood, 'the heart', 'the soul' and 'the spirit' (see Quotes VII).


For more coverage of 'cognitive psychology', see:
BRAND, C.R. (1996) The g Factor.
Chichester : Wiley DePublisher.
The book was first issued, in March, but then withdrawn by the 'publisher' because it was deemed to have infringed modern canons of
'political correctness.'
It received a perfectly favourable review in Nature (May 2, 1996, p. 33).

For a Summary of the book, Newsletters concerning the
de-publication affair, details of how to see the book for scholarly purposes, and others' comments and reviews,
see the Internet URL sites:

For Chris Brand's 'Get Real About Race!'-his popular exposition of his views on race and education in the Black
hip-hop music magazine 'downlow' (Autumn, 1996)-see:



(i) Sympathies for and hopes of the cognitive approach. 7

(ii) The background: 'information processing' and early modern cognitivism. 9

(iii) Modern cognitivism: the full flowering. 10

(iv) Objections to the arrival of modern cognitivism. 12

(v) Problems of cognitivism. 16

(vi) Some defences of cognitivism. 23

(vii) Verdicts on modern cognitivism. 26

(i) Sympathies for and hopes of the cognitive approach

"Anyone who believes that inquisitions went out with the triumph of secularism over religion has not paid attention to the records of foundations, federal research agencies, professional societies, and academic institutes and departments.... Macromutationists in biology, catastrophists in geology, and cognitive theorists in psychology are among those who have known inquisitions in psychology."
R.NISBET, 1982, Prejudices.
Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press.

"The principal reason for the dominance in modern psychology of the cognitive perspective is the failure of behaviourism (of the Watsonian and Skinnerian varieties) to account for higher cognitive processes in humans. This was precisely G.H.Mead's critique of Watsonism. He said that Watson's attitude was like that of the Queen in Alice in Wonderland: 'off with their heads' - nothing above the spinal cord."
R.FARR, 1987, Presidential address to the British Psychological
Society, British Psychological Society Bulletin 40.

"Now that psychology has rediscovered cognition, and has lost interest in behaviourism and its laws of learning, general intelligence (g) has resumed its position as psychology's main theoretical construct - on a par with the gene for geneticists, with social class for sociologists, and with the atom for chemists."
C.R.BRAND, 1987, Nature 325, 26 ii.

"....the scientific notions of causality and mechanism, as applied to human beings, were vehemently rejected (by Noam Chomsky, 1959, Language 35, in his critique of B.F.Skinner's behaviourism) in favour of freedom and creativity. The human being was to be newly, scientifically, but above all morally viewed as a free-acting agent, not framed by any mechanical or animal analogy. Creativity was to oust mechanism; freedom must replace determinism in the new, cognitive psychology."
Carol A. SHERRARD (University of Bradford), 1988,
'Psychology and the values of the 1960's'.

"[My thesis is that] conditioning in humans is fundamentally a cognitive process, and not an automatic, unconscious, peripheral one, [in which] cognitive processes play little or no part. The results both of an extensive literature review and of experiments conducted substantiate this.... {For example, Experiment II showed} almost immediate reversal of a conditioned responding from CS+ to CS- after subjects were [informed] of a reversal of stimulus contingencies, as well as almost immediate extinction of conditioned responding induced by instructions that UCS presentation would no longer occur (10 human subjects). Experiment III found that verbal operant conditioning did not happen in the absence of awareness of response reinforcer contingencies)...."
Shane O'MARA, 1990, Irish Journal of Psychology 11.

"It is not without significance that one of Spearman's (1923) major works bore the title The Nature of Intelligence and the Principles of Cognition. Indeed, reading Spearman's (1930) autobiography one finds that Spearman was centrally much more interested in finding and establishing "laws" of cognition than in measuring individual differences, and it was apparently this interest that kept him focused on the factor of General Intelligence because he believed that g embodied general laws of cognition better than any group factor might do.... "Cognitive ability" is not a new term: Wolfle (1940) used it more than fifty years ago, as did Spearman (1923)."
J.B.CARROLL, 1993, Human Cognitive Abilities.
Cambridge University Press.

(ii) The background: 'information processing' and early modern cognitivism.

"....recent psychological evidence to the effect that IQ differences can be psychologically understood as differences in information-processing speed (Hamilton & Launay, 1976; Nettelbeck & Lally, 1976; Elliott & Murray, 1977; Anderson, 1977) is no longer compatible with the notion that theorizing about intelligence will lead to the overthrow of IQ testing."
C.R.BRAND, 1979, Bulletin of British Psychological Society 3.

"Our theory posits internal mechanisms of great extent and complexity, and endeavours to make contact between them and the visible evidence of problem solving. That is all there is to it."
A.NEWELL & H.A.SIMON, 1972, Human Problem Solving.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice Hall.

"....modern cognitive psychology is not just a psychology of knowledge and thought, but rather a psychology rich in complex mechanisms broadly conceived as 'cognitive'."
G.A.MANDLER, 1979.

(iii) Modern cognitivism: the full flowering

"According to the view of thinking that is emerging in cognitive science, mental behaviour should be explained by identifying the processes involved in problem-solving, rather than by producing abstract descriptions of the outcome of thinking. The cognitive science view is that intelligence is an abstraction and does not have a cause."
E.HUNT, 1983, Science 219.

"Several prominent contemporary theorists of intelligence base their theories in large part upon individual differences in the speed with which people process information.... What is critical is not speed per se, but rather speed selection - knowing when to perform at what rate.... What remaining correlation if left after sheer shared-speed requirements are taken into account may well be accounted for in part by metacomponential processing.
There simply is no single scientifically meaningful level for the study of intelligence."
R.J.STERNBERG, 1984, Behavioural & Brain Sciences 7.

"The fashion in psychology is to conceptualize the cognitive system as being organized into separable processing modules."
A.YOUNG, 1985, Nature.

"My definition of intelligence is that intelligence consists of those mental functions purposively employed for purposes of adaptation to and shaping and selection of real-world environments."
R.J.STERNBERG, 1985, Science, 6 xii.

"....what seems to be indicated by intelligence is a "fuzzy" set of partly irreconcilable concepts, ideas, and research questions.... rather than speak of intelligence per se, my preference is to speak of constructs such as innate intellectual capacity (Anlage), intellectual reserve capacity, learning capacity, intellectual abilities, intelligent systems, problem-solving ability and knowledge systems."
P.R.BALTES, 1986, in R.J.Sternberg & D.K.Detterman
What is Intelligence? Norwood, NJ. : Ablex.

"....conscious strategies can alter the demands that a task makes upon elementary information-processing capacities and, through them, upon biological capacity. Examples abound. Mnemonists free themselves from limits on short-term memory capacity. People from different cultures may approach the same task as an exercise in verbal or in visual memory. The flexibility of the human cognitive system is a sufficient reason to refuse to say "What causes intelligence?" A far better question is "How are individual differences displayed in this or that class of cognitive tasks?" Such questions cannot be answered by assigning a person a number based upon that person's relative standing in a population. The conventional IQ score has no place in a computational theory of intelligence."
E.HUNT, 1986, in R.J.Sternberg & D.K.Detterman,
What is Intelligence? Norwood, NJ. : Ablex.

"The real intent of Artificial Intelligence is, I claim, to find out what intelligence is all about.... We can fairly easily make a program write bad sonnets or play poor chess. Neither of these feats seems much of a mark of intelligence.... It isn't the tasks themselves that are interesting. What matters is how they are done. Thus, I claim, the only way to know if our machines, or people, are intelligent, is to make them explain how they did what they did.... people can attempt to give rational explanations, and ultimately that is how we must measure intelligence."
R.C.SCHANK, 1986, in R.J.Sternberg & D.K.Detterman,
What is Intelligence? Norwood, NJ. : Ablex.

"The amount of computational power that a dollar can purchase has increased a thousand fold every two decades since the beginning of the century. In eighty years, there has been a trillion fold decline in the cost of calculation. If this rate of improvement were to continue into the next century, the 10 teraops required for a humanlike computer would be available in a $10-million supercomputer before 2010, and in a $1,000 personal computer by 2030."
Hans MORAVEC, 1988, Mind Children. Harvard University Press.

"What entities do we talk about in the domain of the cognitive? One of the main functions of the brain is to "represent" things. Collections of representations in the brain are often referred to as "maps". A typical Ordnance Survey map is a good metaphor for a brain map. Such a map contains information.... It has long been known that there is a map of the body spread along the primary motor cortex from the legs (at the top) to the mouth (at the bottom). ....there is a long way to go before consciousness can be "explained" in terms of brain function."
Chris FRITH, 1995, Times Higher Educational Supplement, 20 x.
(Reviewing M.S.Gazzaniga, The Cognitive Neurosciences, MIT.)

(iv) Objections to the arrival of modern cognitivism

"Cognitive psychology is really a dogma in search of a theory."
H.J.EYSENCK, 1979, The Structure and Measurement
of Human Intelligence
. Berlin : Springer.

"....the best tests of individual differences in cognitive ability are non-cognitive in nature."
H.J.EYSENCK, 1982.

"Fundamentally the research program of the contemporary cognitive psychologist does not differ from that of the behaviourist."
W.BECHTEL, 1982, Philosophy of Science 49.

"....the much vaunted revolution of cognitive science is more promise than achievement."
J.C.MARSHALL, 1984, British Journal of Psychology 75.

"If this book [edited by J.Mehler] fairly represents the state of cognitive psychology today, the field is a collection of local topics or small constellations of topics."
R.ROSNER, 1984, British Journal of Developmental Psychology.

"Cognitive psychology is frequently presented as a revolt against behaviourism; but it is not a revolt, it is a retreat."
B.F.SKINNER, 1984, American Psychologist.

"Such is the enormous range of g's correlations with valued human characteristics, especially across the normal and lower ranges of IQ and Mental Age, that the former endeavours of psychometricians and the present-day efforts of 'cognitive' psychologists to associate g especially with reasoning or decision-making can be recognized as far too narrow."
C.R.BRAND, 1984, in H.B.Miles, Intelligence and Society.
North Humberside : Nafferton Books.

"If it turns out that a large proportion of the variance in psychometric g is explained by the elementary cognitive processes reflected in reaction time measurements, what will be left over for Sternberg's metacomponents to account for, unless it is mainly the 'real-life' manifestations of g in educational and occupational achievements?"
A.R.JENSEN, 1984, Behavioral & Brain Sciences 7.

"It is [the] overinclusiveness [of Sternberg's theory] that makes the theory scientifically meaningless and unacceptable. It deals, not only with intelligence, but with possible ways in which intelligence is used in everyday life, modified by temperamental and motivational factors, and influenced by educational, cultural and other factors."
H.J.EYSENCK, 1984, Behavioral & Brain Sciences 7.

"....what is on offer (from cognitive psychology) is not discovery and explanation, but pious speculations and grant proposals that would only have bored, not intimidated, Binet and the other founding fathers of mental testing."
C.R.BRAND, 1984, Behavior Research & Therapy.

"I accuse cognitive scientists of speculating about internal processes with respect to which they have no appropriate means of observation. Cognitive science is often only premature neurology."
B.F.SKINNER, 1985, 'Cognitive science and behaviourism'.
British Journal of Psychology 76.

"[The last section of R.J.Sternberg's 'triarchic theory of human intelligence'] is particularly confusing, as it can easily generate an infinite regress of metaprocesses, executive functions and strategies. This is not the stuff of productive theories. It is the replacing of mentality with spurious references to the specific vocabulary of Artificial Intelligence and, unfortunately, psychobabble." V.EGAN, 1986, Psychology News, No. 44.

"Cognitive science, according to J.A.Fodor, should concern itself with modules rather than central processes, because this is an attainable scientific goal, whereas the scientific understanding of central processes is most probably not.... cognitive science is explicitly unconcerned with individual differences. When views on modularity are directly translated into the individual differences field they generate models of intelligence which are simple re-hashes of the old specificity hypothesis (e.g. H.Gardner, 1983, Frames of Mind)."
Journal of Child Psychology & Psychiatry 27.

"A machine cannot think, any more than a book can remember. The meanings of the words on a printed page are bestowed by minds; they have only a delegated intentionality.... Computer bewitchment threatens to eclipse an appreciation of the biological and historical depths of human nature."
L.S.HEARNSHAW, 1987, The Shaping of Modern Psychology.
London : Routledge & Kegan Paul.

"Psychology as a science is, in fact, in a shambles.... Psychology is apparently abandoning all efforts to stay within the dimensional system of natural science.... In following the Pied Piper of cognitive science, psychology has lost its hold upon reality."
B.F.SKINNER, 1987, Upon Further Reflection.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice-Hall.

"Cognitivists need reminding when they come on strongly about their re-discovery of 'the mind' that, once we begin to entertain such lofty abstractions, 'the mind' must be prepared for some competition - notably from 'the heart', 'the soul' and 'the spirit'. In ordinary language, each of these four high-level metaphorical components of personhood serves subtly different functions: not all of them are capable of 'warmth', 'sensitivity', 'determination' or 'tidiness', for example."
C.R.BRAND, 1987, Behaviour Research & Therapy.

"Chomsky's demonstrations were very widely accepted as decisive arguments against Behaviourism, and in favour of a new conceptualisation of psychology. However, of these apparently radical observations about human cognition- its embodiment in innate competence rather than learned performance, its generativity, its non-finiteness, and its rule-governed transformations of deep structures into surface structures - it is questionable whether any of them genuinely inform the theories or methods of what is today called Cognitive Psychology."
Carol A. SHERRARD (University of Bradford), 1988,
'Psychology and the values of the 1960's'.

"In relation to ordinary computer designers and programmers, [students of artificial intelligence] may be compared with aeronautic engineers who are concerned not to devise the most efficient aeroplane, but to construct an artificial bird. Devotees of 'cognitive science' may operate in a number of different disciplines - philosophy, empirical psychology, artificial intelligence. The name is not so much the demarcation of an area of study as a manifesto of belief that the characteristic features of human mentality will eventually be explicable in demythologized form by certain fashionable scientific procedures."
Anthony KENNY, 1989, The Metaphysics of Mind. Oxford : Clarendon.

"....the points {against behaviourism} contained in Chomsky's (1959, Language 35) review [of B.F.Skinner's Verbal Behavior] have been dealt with at length and have been satisfactorily answered (Catania, 1973, Behaviorism 2; MacCorquadale, 1970, J. Exptl. Anal. Behav.)."
K.J.TIERNEY, 1990, Irish Journal of Psychology 11.

"As [Francis] Crick points out in The Astonishing Hypothesis, there are at least five good reasons why brains are not like computers. First, a computer can compute at more than ten million operations per second, while a neuron fires at only 100 spikes per second. Second, computers work mainly by serial processing, while the brain is usually massively parallel (hence computers regularly crash, unlike brains). Third, neurons, but not transistors, can modulate their behaviour during processing. Fourth, memory in a brain appears to be stored in the very same locations that carry out the processing, while memory in computers is quite separate. Fifth, there is no clear distinction in the brain between hardware and software."
Editorial, Times Higher Educational Supplement, 24 vi 1994.

(v) Problems of cognitivism

"A major item on the agenda of cognitive psychology is to banish the homunculus. It is the homunculus that actually performs the control processes in Atkinson & Shiffrin's (1968) famous memory model,.... who is renamed the "executive" in many models (clearly a promotion), and who decides on and builds all those flow diagrams."
A.NEWELL, 1980, in R.S.Nickerson, Attention and Performance 8.
Hillsdale, NJ : Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

"[A schema] is some active array of physiological structures and processes: not a center in the brain, but an entire system that includes receptors and afferents and feed-forward units and efferents. Within the brain itself there must be entities whose activities account for the modifiability and organization of the schema: assemblages of neurons, functional things still unguessed."
U.NEISSER, 1976, Cognition and Reality. San Francisco : Freeman.

"Computational psychology is the only theoretical psychology we can ever hope to achieve; [yet] it is in principle incapable of addressing what many would regard as the prime question of psychology: how symbolic processes guide our perception of and action in the world."
J.A.FODOR, 1980, Behavioral & Brain Sciences 3.

"While cognitive psychology is now very extensively studied, the will and the emotions are still sadly neglected."

"Humans may be an amalgam of several kinds of computers or computer models, or may deviate from any kind of computer yet described."
H.GARDNER, 1985, The Mind's New Science: A History of the
Cognitive Revolution
. New York : Basic Books.

"The notion of an "executive process" in the brain is always an invitation to fuzzy thinking."
H.H.SPITZ, 1986, reviewing R.J.Sternberg's 'triarchic theory
of intelligence'. Behavioral & Brain Sciences 9.

"{Re H.Gardner's The Mind's New Science,} the description is of a social movement rather than of a body of data."
D.E.BROADBENT, 1986, Nature, 13 ii.

"Younger and less intelligent people have been said to have smaller and less elaborately organized knowledge bases; to use fewer, simpler, and more passive processing strategies; to have less metacognitive understanding of their own cognitive systems and of how the functioning of these systems depends upon the environment; and to use less complete and flexible executive processes for controlling their thinking.... Although definitive analyses have not been done, presently used tests of intelligence can be assumed to measure base knowledge and cognitive strategies reliably and validly." E.C.BUTTERFIELD, 1986, in R.J.Sternberg & D.K.Detterman, What is Intelligence?. Norwood, New Jersey : Ablex.

"Although [the Conference on Academic Performance of Minority Children, at Cornell University in 1982] was convened on the assumption that the study of school learning is within the scope of cognitive psychology, we soon learned that the critical variables in this area are also ecological and political."
U.NEISSER, 1986, in U.Neisser, The School Achievement of
Minority Children: New Perspectives
. Hillsdale, NJ : Erlbaum.

"Much thinking is extremely weird, and computers have not yet captured this weirdness."
L.S.HEARNSHAW, 1987, The Shaping of Modern Psychology.
London : Routledge & Kegan Paul.

"Most cognitive theorists now admit that they need a model of consciousness. The only adequate model, in my opinion, will be a social one.... To describe events only in the language of cognitive science is inadequate."
R.FARR, 1987, Bulletin of British Psychological Society 40.

"There is a story, possibly apocryphal, of one research worker who designed a Parallel Distributed Processor system to simulate an aspect of cognition. The simulation was highly successful, but he spent the next several years doing experiments to try to find out how the system he had constructed actually worked."
S.SUTHERLAND, 1987, Times Higher Educational Supplement, 27 ii.

"Schoolchildren of enormous mathematical talent resort to different problem-solving strategies from those resorted to by problem-solving machines."
F.FLIX (Berlin Humboldt University), 1988, to 24th International
Congress of Psychology (Abstract I22).

"The booksellers W.H.Smith's new computer, christened BOOKFINDER, was being shown off at the company's Swindon offices when it was asked to find a book with the word "cat" or "dog" in its title. The machine excelled. "Catholic Dogma", it suggested."
A Daily Telegraph report, repeated in Encounter 72, v 1989.

"....Cognitive Psychology shows no consensus about what the central phenomena of cognition are, has weak theoretical structure, and has not seriously adopted the Chomskyan 1960's ideal to avoid mechanical analogies and seek allegedly uniquely human possessions of generativity, non-finiteness and deep structure. Rather, it has kept the traditional concerns of Psychology with the nature of the link between sensory stimuli and performance, and the measurement of finite performance capacity. The analysis of creativity was always more seriously addressed by differential psychologists, ironically consigned to the same allegedly right-wing ghetto as Behaviourists by critical social and cognitive psychologists."
Carol SHERRARD (University of Bradford), 1989.

"....whereas [a digital] computer processes information serially, the brain is known to work in parallel fashion. In addition, although the brain operates slower than the computer, the brain is "far more adaptable, tolerant of errors, and context-sensitive"(P.Kline, 1988, Psychology Exposed). Furthermore, even the most sophisticated supercomputer developed to date "seems unlikely to achieve more than 1 per cent of the brain's storage capacity (J.T.Schwartz, 1988).... [Moreover] many cognitive models "seem to be theories of pure reason" (D.A.Norman, 1980). This exaggerated rationalism is a legacy from Descartes who was the first modern philosopher to postulate a radical separation of mind from body. If human beings are pure intellects, then their knowledge is purely intellectual and the human body need not be taken into account in a theory of cognition.... In a similar vein, Claxton (1988) reminded us that, whereas human cognition grows ontogenetically "on the basis of a vast amount of (mostly non-verbal) experience", 'the computer's knowledge' arrives codified, ready-made and relatively fixed.... Despite obvious differences between the Classical and the Connectionist approaches, they both appear to be forms of computationalism, albeit different forms. The classical computational architecture resembles Hobbesian ratiocination, and the Parallel Distributed Processing approach seems like Lockean associationism."
G.CASEY & A.MORAN, 1989, 'The computational metaphor and
cognitive psychology'. Irish Journal of Psychology 10.

"In information-speak, it requires just 42 bits to remember an eight-digit number string, yet it would appear that most humans lack the memory capacity to do it.... Can it really be that human have no more memory capacity than a microcomputer?....
By contrast with computers, brain memory is error-full, and uses multiple different modalities. And it is on the basis of meaning, not sequence, that I [can 'recall a 48-digit list - containing a sequence of birthdays and friends' telephone numbers].... Meaning implies a dynamic of interaction between myself and the digits; meaning is a process that is not reducible to a number of bits of information."
Steven ROSE, 1993, New Statesman & Society, 19 iii.

"Cognitive science has had far more than its share of modellers, but precious few thinkers and theorists. If ever there were a task that required good imagination intermingled with hard thought, it is the job of understanding the human brain and mind."
E.S.REED, 1990, 'A surfeit of models'. Nature 348, 1 xi.

"[Current cognitive science consists of] several separate disciplines jostling each other for position in a coalescence that may be illusory."
J.LEIBER, 1991, An Invitation to Cognitive Science. Oxford : Blackwell.

"Calculating devices were invented long before computers, ranging from the humble abacus to the slide-rule and the mechanical calculating machines invented in the nineteenth century. No one was tempted to say that these gadgets could literally calculate or think. Are electronic computers any different? It is tempting to insist that they are, not merely because the tasks that they can be used to undertake are so much more complex, but also because they surely follow rules. For do we not programme them with ever more sophisticated algorithms, and do they not follow these instructions meticulously? No; one can no more literally instruct a compute to do anything than once can instruct a tree, though one can make a tree grow in a certain way, and one can make a computer produce the result of vastly complex calculations. One can replace a complex rule with a sequence of simpler rules compliance with which will ensure the same outcome, and human beings can typically follow such simple rules quite mechanically, i.e. without reflecting. But a machine cannot follow a rule mechanically, no matter whether the rule is simple or complex, since it makes no sense to talk of a machine following a rule.... A being can only be said to be following a rule in the context of a complex practice involving actual and potential normative activities of justifying, noticing mistakes and correcting them by reference to the relevant rule, criticizing deviations from the rule, and, if called upon, explaining an action as being in accord with the rule or teaching others what counts as following the rule. ...could one say that...machines are making calculations independently of human beings? No, no more than one can say that the revolving globe tells the time independently of human beings' conventions of time-measurement... One could readily build a computer from a very large toy railway set with a huge number of switch-points and storage depots for different types of carriages to be shunted into until called upon for further operations (i.e. a 'computer memory'). This computer would be cumbersomely large and slow, but in essence its operations would not differ from the latest gadgetry on the computer-market. Would one say, as hundreds of trains rush through complex networks of on/off points according to a pre-arranged timetable (a programme), depositing trucks in sidings or depots and collecting others, 'Now the railway-set is calculating', 'Now it is inferring', or 'Now it is thinking?' Does it make any difference if the 'railway-set' is miniscule and the 'trains' move at the speed of electric current?.... ....What prevents the literal applicability of concepts of thought, reason, and inference to our calculating devices are not deficiencies in computational power, which may be overcome b y fifth-generation computers. Rather, it is the fact that machines are not alive. They have no biography, let alone autobiography. The concepts of growth, maturation, and death have no application to them, nor do those of nutrition, health, and reproduction. It makes no sense to attribute to a machine will or passion, desire or suffering. The concepts of thinking and reasoning, however, are woven into this rich web of psychological faculties. It is only of a living creature that we can say that it manifests those complex patterns of behaviour and reaction within the ramifying context of a form of life that constitute the grounds, in appropriate circumstances, for the ascription of even part of the network of psychological concepts.... Thinking is a capacity of the animate, manifest in the behaviour and action characteristic of its form of life. We need neither hope nor fear that computers may think; the good and evil they bring us is not of their making. If, for some strange and perverse reason we wished to create artificially a thinking thing, as opposed to a device that will save us the trouble of thinking, we would have to start, as it were, with animality, not rationality. Desire and suffering are the roots of thought, not mechanical computation. Artificial intelligence is no more a form of intelligence than fool's gold is a kind of gold or counterfeit money a form of legitimate currency."
P.M.S.HACKER, 1990, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind.
Oxford : Blackwell.

"J.T.Bruer (Schools for Thought: a Science of Learning in the Classroom, MIT Press) claims [that educational innovations such as 'exposing students to words in the same category']....stem from advances in cognitive psychology. Perhaps they were triggered by that discipline, but they come perilously close to common sense.... [And, using Bruer's] techniques for teaching physics...., students took more than a week to learn Newton's laws instead of the normal day or two."
Stuart SUTHERLAND, 1993, Nature 364, 8 vii.

"In artificial intelligence, studying theories of inference and knowledge representation usually begins by examining their capabilities in toy domains. Toy domains are specially contrived micro-worlds about which very little needs to be assumed. There is, however, a long-standing problem with this approach. Theories of inference which are adequate in such domains (e.g. the inference engine in SHRDLU: Wino grad, 1972) tend to fail disastrously when they are scaled up to deal with real-world inferential problems involving more information. This is because they are generally computation-intractable."
M.OAKSFORD & N.CHATER, 1992, Theory and Psychology 2.

"Conscious minds are more-or-less serial virtual machines implemented - inefficiently - on the parallel hardware that evolution has provided for us."
Behavioral & Brain Sciences 15.

"....a task routinely mastered by four-year-old children is too richly structured to be accounted for by any known general-purpose mechanism operating in real time (e.g. Chomsky, 1975; Pinker, 1991). Despite three decades of effort by Standard Model psychologists to get general-purpose cognitive machinery to learn grammar, their theories have fared no better than did their behaviourist predecessors. ....newly proposed domain-general connectionist and associationist models were computationally insufficient to solve even so narrow a problem as the acquisition of the past tense in English.... Thirty years of such findings have forced many cognitive psychologists, against their inclination, to accept domain-specific hypotheses about language learning - to conclude that humans have as part of their evolved design a language acquisition device (LAD), which incorporates content-dependent procedures that reflect in some form "universal grammar.""
John TOOBY & Leda COSMIDES, 1992, in J.H.Barkow, L.Cosmides & J.Tooby, The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. New York : Oxford University Press.

"There is no basis for attributing intelligence or consciousness to neural networks....No scientific credibility should be attached to the belief that consciousness must be an emergent property of complex systems."
David START, 1995, 'Cunning humans, selfless machines.'
Times Higher Educational Supplement, 28 iv, p.17.
"The story of Henry Ant, composed by a computer program called Tale-Spin, is ammunition for those who say computers cannot be creative: "Henry Ant was thirsty. He walked over to the river bank where his good friend Bill Bird was sitting. Henry slipped and fell in the river. He was unable to call for help. He drowned. The End."
Aisling IRWIN, 1995, Times Higher Educational Supplement, 1175, 12 v.

"Why should people compulsively pull out their own hair? And why should some people believe that their relatives or friends have been replaced by replicas?....[The book Eccentric and Bizarre Behaviors] should be brought to the attention of those research workers in artificial intelligence who believe that by writing programs that behave intelligently they are simulating the human mind."
Stuart SUTHERLAND, 1995, Times Higher
Educational Supplement
, 22 xii.

"If [Daniel] Dennett hopes that consciousness will spontaneously evolve in his expanding artificial brain....why not start with "simple" biological brains themselves, and save all the waiting and the work?"
Susan GREENFIELD, 1996, 'Dances with neurons.'
Times Higher, 2 ii.

"....you cannot download a headache as computer aficionados might download a problem-solving strategy. First-person consciousness is locked into the biological body, but cognitive processes are not."
Susan GREENFIELD, 1996, 'Towering inferences.'
Times Higher, 11 x.

(vi) Some defences of cognitivism

"....a growing number of theorists have become disillusioned with the prospects of psychological theories based on the traditional conceptions of internal symbol manipulation (e.g. to theories that describe mental processes using formalisms similar to programming languages like LISP and PASCAL). For all the strengths of the traditional approach, it has often proved to be too costly to carry out seemingly simple (but intensive) computations in real time (e.g. stereopsis), and too rigid to capture the nuances of human cognition.... [The latest] approach, which goes by various names, including connectionism, parallel distributed processing, and neural network modelling retains the idea that the mind is a computer program, but insists that the program runs on a kind of computer very unlike the familiar digital computer that sits on so many desktops...."
J.RUECKL, 1989, American Journal of Psychology 102.

"Artificial intelligence is now more than forty years old.... A massive amount of scientific, intellectual and financial investment appears to have resulted in very little, either as a pointer to the way our brains work or [in] improvements in the usefulness of computers."
Igor ALEKSANDER, 1990, Nature 348, 29 xi.

"How....does one learn effectively without a supervisor?.... The goal of an unsupervised learning algorithm is to extract meaningful features or variables from a set of input patterns.... This is the goad of Principal Component Analysis, a standard tool of engineering and statistics {and differential psychology}.... Remarkably enough, it turns out that the first neurobiological learning rule to be formulated, Hebb's rule, is closely related to Principal Component Analysis."
G.MITCHISON & R.DURBIN, 1992, 'Neural networks conduct factor
analyses?!' Nature 355, pp.112-113.

"Essentially, a neural network is a way of processing information. It consists of a number of units, or nodes, arranged in layers; each unit is connected to several other units elsewhere in the network. Units can be either active or inactive: active units send signals to other units that either excite or inhibit them.... A single unit may receive competing signals from many other units, the combined effect of which will turn it either on or off. Information entering the system at one end, in the form of a pattern of activity among the units in the first layer, is processed through the network and eventually emerges as an output - the activity of the final layer. The interest of these structures lies in the fact that they can learn. By modifying the strengths of the connections between the units according to certain rules, a network can then generalise correctly to patterns it has not 'seen' before." Georgina FERRY, 1992, Oxford Today: the University Magazine 4.

"The contributors to Against Cognitivism [eds. A.Still & A.Costall, 1991, Harvester Wheatsheaf] are not of one mind as far as their preferred alternatives to cognitivism are concerned.... [some] seem to regard the Gibsonian approach as forming at least part of the answer.... [their] recommended cures appear far worse than the disease."
M.W.EYSENCK, 1993, The Psychologist 6.

"G.Edelman and his colleagues at the Neurosciences Institute [Rockefeller University] have been deeply interested in...."synthetic neural modelling," and have devised a series of "synthetic animals" or artefacts [called DARWINs} to test the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection.... they are not robotic in the least but (in Edelmann's words) "noetic." They incorporate both a selectional system and a primitive set of values.... Unpredictable variations are introduced in both the artefact and its environment. DARWIN IV, or NOMAD, wanders around like a curious infant, exploring....objects, reaching for them, classifying them, building with them, in a spontaneous and idiosyncratic way (the movement of the artefact is exceedingly slow, and one needs time-lapse photography to bring home its creatural quality). No two individuals show identical behaviour...."
Oliver SACKS, 1993, 'Making up the mind',
The New York Review, 84 iv.

"[Margaret Boden, in e.g. The Creative Mind] has categorised objections to the ideas that computers could be creative. They are:
the brain-stuff argument (computers are made of non-biological material so they cannot be creative);
the empty program argument (computers will never grasp meaning);
the consciousness argument (consciousness is essential to creativity and artificial intelligence cannot be conscious); and
the non-human argument (creative beings would deserve rights, computers do not have rights, therefore computers cannot be creative).
She rejects the first three.... "I would say that computers can't be truly creative, for moral and political reasons. If a computer literally has creativity then it literally has desires and interests-it would be part of our ethical world. "
Aisling IRWIN, 1995, interviewing Margaret Boden, Times Higher Educational Supplement, 1175, 12 v.

"Instead of 'representing' the world or in any way thinking about it (or even making calculations or inferences about it) what computers do is to by-pass such processes while delivering what are for human purposes satisfactory input-output translations. A computer does not play chess; rather, it mimicks chess-playing. - If it did play chess, it would be appropriate to ask whether it enjoyed its game! (For a sustained refutation of the notion that computers or robots 'represent' or otherwise possess mentality, see Hacker (1990, Chapter I, 'Men, minds and machines')."
C.R.BRAND, 1996, The g Factor. Chichester : Wiley DePublisher.

(vii) Verdicts on modern cognitivism

"Although cognitive psychologists threw out behaviorism's cumbersome anti-mentalism, they uncritically adopted behaviourism's equipotentiality assumption. In mainstream cognitive psychology, it is assumed that the machine is free of content-specialized processes and that it consists primarily of general-purpose mechanisms. Psychologists justify this assumption by an appeal to parsimony: It is "unscientific" to multiply hypothesized mechanisms in the head. The goal, as in physics, is for as few principles as possible to account for as much as possible. Consequently, viewing the mind as a collection of specialized mechanisms that perform specific tasks appears to be a messy approach, one not worth pursuing. Anthropologists and sociologists easily accommodated themselves to these theoretical changes in psychology: Humans went from being viewed as relatively simply equipotential learning systems to very much more complex equipotential information-processing systems, general-purpose computers, or symbol manipulators."
John TOOBY & Leda COSMIDES, 1992, in J.H.Barkow, L.Cosmides & J.Tooby, The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. New York : Oxford University Press.

"The community of researchers calling themselves cognitive scientists has expanded dramatically, including a startling reincarnation of many former behaviourists. This is consistent with the increasing emphasis placed on "inter-disciplinarity" in several areas. Traditional departmental divides have been challenged and new groupings have come together, often with the support of large research grants.... But what does inter-disciplinarity mean in practice? For example, why and how should we expect a psychologist to co-operate successfully with a computer scientist, say, when the different branches of psychology often have trouble talking to each other? Is cognitive science a unitary enterprise? Some recent work from within the field has challenged the idea - except, perhaps, a common focus on cognition. Indeed, the compendious Oxford Companion to the Mind....has no entry for cognitive science at all.... Barbara Von Eckhardt (What is Cognitive Science?) restricts her exposition to (cognitive science) studies of "adult, normal, typical cognition", jarringly coded as ANTCOG." Michael SCAIFE, 1993, Times Higher Educational Supplement, 2 iv.

"Publicly, [AI pioneers] made extraordinary claims that to make a machine with the intelligence of a human was merely a matter of making computers bigger and faster. The discovery that their results seemed to fall short of their claims tended to be a much more private affair. As an idle thought, where would an aircraft designer be with a similar record of failure? The answer is that he would be unemployed if not in jail."
Igor ALEKSANDER, 1993, Nature 364,
reviewing D.Crevier, Artificial Intelligence.

"The technological predictions of the sixties read very strangely now. Computer speed and memory were already doubling every year. Soon, said the pundits, computers would overtake the human brain itself.... But computers are still as wooden and stupid as they ever were. They are just as wooden and stupid in 128 pointless fonts and 16 million indistinguishable colours."
D.JONES, 1993, 'Daedalus', Nature 364.

"Towards the end of a century of psychology dominated by behaviourist, cognitive and sociological approaches, it would be the ultimate triumph of Darwin to find the psychology of the next century returning to the individual mind and its emotions seen as products of evolution."
C.BADCOCK, 1993, Personality. & Individual Differences 14.

"....the word "cognition" is seriously misunderstood and seriously misapplied in contemporary psychology; ....many who describe themselves as cognitive psychologists miss the core of their subject."
J.MACNAMARA, 1993, 'Cognitive psychology and the rejection of Brentano.' Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour 23.

"....the information-processing model of cognition is the clearest legacy of utopianism. This theory of human cognition is influential in the United States and offers the computer as a model for human thought. This model is utopian to an even greater degree than other cognitive theories. It is based on the assumption that human problem-solving can be broken down into incremental steps which are in essence acquired rule-bound skills. Its authors assume that the way in which human mentation follows rules of logical inference is best exemplified by the way in which a computer processes information, e.g. as elementary bits of data."
M.W.BARCLAY, 1993, Theory and Psychology 3.

"...the great merit of [D.Gelenter's] The Muse in the Machine is that it tries to put emotion into artificial intelligence; its great weakness is that it fails.... [Joseph Weizenbaum many years ago] pointed out that....no computer could genuinely have [our evolutionarily selected drives]: at most its might exhibit a desire for the nearest electric plug. No matter how successful we were in simulating [human] emotions and drives on a computer, the program would still be a simulation, not the real thing." S. SUTHERLAND, 1994, Nature 369, 2 vi.

"Cognitive psychology is based on the idea of the "mind as computer" while clinical psychology has been influenced heavily by behavioural ideas based originally on animal studies, said Professor Baddeley {whose MRC Applied Psychology Unit at Cambridge was celebrating its 50th anniversary}."
Aisling IRWIN, 1994, Times Higher Educational Supplement, 7 x.

"....when researchers met at Dartmouth College in the summer of 1956 to lay the groundwork for Artificial Intelligence, none of them could have imagined that, forty years later, we would have come such a short distance toward that goal. Indeed, what few successes AI has had point up the weaknesses of computerized reasoning as much as they do its strengths.... Ask a medical program [i.e. 'expert system'] about a rusty old car and it might blithely diagnose measles."
LENAT, D.B. (1995). 'Artificial Intelligence.' Scientific American 273.


(Compiled by C.R.Brand, Dept Psychology, University of Edinburgh.)

For more coverage of cognitive psychology, see:
BRAND, C.R. (1996) The g Factor.
Chichester : Wiley DePublisher.

"The nature and measurement of intelligence is a political hot potato. But Brand in this extremely readable, wide-ranging and up-to-date
book is not afraid to slaughter the shibboleths of modern "educationalists". This short book provides a great deal for thought
and debate."
Professor Adrian Furnham, University College London.
The book was first issued, in February, but then withdrawn, in April, by the 'publisher' because it was deemed to have infringed modern canons of
'political correctness.'
It received a perfectly favourable review in Nature (May 2, 1996, p. 33).

For a Summary of the book, Newsletters concerning the
de-publication affair, details of how to see the book for scholarly purposes, and others' comments and reviews,
see the Internet URL sites:

For Chris Brand's 'Get Real About Race!'-his popular exposition of his views on race and education in the Black
hip-hop music magazine 'downlow' (Autumn, 1996)-see:

A reminder of what is available in other Sections of 'P, B & S.'
Summary Index

(This resource manual of quotations about individual and group differences, compiled by
Mr C. R. Brand, is kept on the Internet and in Edinburgh University Psychology Department Library.)
Pages of Introduction
3 - 11 Full Index, indicating key questions in each Section.
12 - 14 Preface. - Why quotations? - Explanations and apologies.
15 - 51 Introduction: Questions, Arguments and Agreements in the study of Personality.
Some history, and a discussion of 'realism vs 'idealism.'
52 - 57 Introductory Quotes about the study of personality.
General problems
1 'Situational' vs 'personological' approaches to human variation.
2 'Nomothetic' vs 'idiographic', 'subjective' and relativistic approaches.
3 Personality dimensions-by factor analysis and otherwise.
4 'Superstructure' and 'infrastructure.' - The 'mind/body problem'.
5 Nature versus Nurture? - Or Nature via Nurture?
6 The role of consciousness in personality and 'multiple personality'.
7 The 'folk psychology' of personality components.
8 The measurement of intelligence. - Does g exist?
9 The bases of intelligence. - What is the psychology of g?
10 The developmental origins of g differences. - The nature and nurture of g.
11 The importance of intelligence. - The psychotelics of g.
12 Piagetianism: Kant's last stand?
13 Cognitivism: 'The Emperor's New Mind?'
14 Neurosis, emotion and Neuroticism.
15 Psychosis, psychopathy and Psychoticism.
16 Crime and criminality.
17 Genius and creativity.
Popular proposals - psychoanalytic, phrenological and prophylactic
18 Psychoanalysis: 'Decline and Fall of the Freudian Empire'?
19 Hemispherology: a twentieth-century phrenology?
20 Psycho-social Engineering: therapy, training or transformation?
Group differences
21 Age and ageing - especially, the role of g in 'life-span development'.
22 Psychological sex differences. - Do they exist? Must they exist?
23 Social class. - Does it matter any longer?
24 Racial and ethnic differences. - Their role in 'lifestyles' and cultural attainments.
Ideological issues
25 The psychology of politics and ideological extremism.
26 The politics of psychologists and allied co-workers.
27 Equality and Community: the 'utopian' package of political aims.
28 Freedom and Responsibility: the 'legitimist' package of political aims.
Pragmatic questions
29 Carry on differentializing?
30 Carry on psycho-testing?
Appendix: Factor Analysis. - 'Garbage in, garbage out'?


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